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Introduction
The role of government in assuring population access 
to affordable and appropriate health care represents 
a central question for any nation. Of particular con-
cern is access to prescription drug coverage, not only 
because of the vital role played by drugs in modern 
medicine, but also because of their high costs. This 
article examines the sharply contrasting prescription 
drug coverage and payment policies found in Australia 
and the U.S. – strong political allies and international 
trading partners – and describes how key U.S. interests 
have sought, through an aggressive trade agenda, to 
expand markets for U.S. goods and services, even when 
market expansions clash with other nations’ contrast-
ing emphasis on social equity and fairness. Indeed, the 
nation’s bilateral free trade negotiations have brought 
the contours of this policy schism into sharp relief.  
We begin with an overview of Australia’s approach 
to prescription drug coverage. We then examine U.S. 
policy, and in particular, its policy approach under 
Medicare, the nation’s only universal health care 
financing system. We also provide a summary table 
of key features, which can be found at the end of this 
article. In examining Medicare prescription drug cov-
erage policy, we pay special attention to two aspects of 
policy design: (1) beneficiaries’ right to choose among 
plans and (2) the right to challenge the benefit design 
(that is, the design of drug plan formularies). Both of 
these policy devices touch deep chords in U.S. society 
regarding notions of fundamental fairness; the ques-
tion is whether, compared to the Australian system, 
these two legal dimensions of the U.S. system create 
fairness that is more illusory than real. 
We conclude with a brief discussion of the ways 
in which the U.S. vision of the role of government in 
advancing markets, along with its desire to safeguard 
its own industries, has resonated in bilateral trade 
agreements, and briefly consider the resulting impacts 
on the Australian system.
The Australian Approach to Prescription 
Drug Coverage: The Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme (PBS)
Australians have benefited from comprehensive out-
patient prescription drug coverage for over 50 years. 
In establishing the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
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(PBS) following the end of World War II, Australia sig-
naled affordable access to essential prescription medi-
cines as a national health policy priority. The objec-
tive of the PBS is to “to provide timely access to the 
medicines that Australians need, at a cost individuals 
and the community can afford.”1 As a key component 
of a broader, single payer, health insurance system, the 
program reimburses community pharmacists for the 
costs of dispensing outpatient prescription medicines 
that are prescribed in accordance with a comprehen-
sive formulary, or “positive list.” 
At its inception, the PBS offered free access to every 
drug in the British Pharmacopoeia for pensioners, 
and 139 “life-saving and disease-preventing” drugs for 
everyone else.2 Since that time, the PBS has evolved 
into a formulary of more than 2,500 different items 
covering most medical conditions for which drug 
therapy is appropriate. The program covers all Austra-
lian residents who are citizens, as well as visitors and 
temporary residents from countries with which Aus-
tralia has reciprocal health care agreements.3 Funded 
through federal taxation revenue, the PBS is essen-
tially a demand-driven program with an uncapped 
appropriation. Beneficiaries do not pay premiums, but 
contribute to the costs of their medicines through flat 
co-payments set at two levels determined by income. 
Importantly, the co-payment does not vary with the 
cost of a drug, and caps on annual out-of-pocket 
expenditures protect against catastrophic costs. 
Consideration of whether, and under what condi-
tions, a drug should be subsidized is the responsibility 
of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
(PBAC). The PBAC is a statutory independent expert 
committee established under the National Health 
Act 1953 to make recommendations to the Minister 
for Health and Ageing on which medicines should be 
included on the PBS formulary, and any listing con-
ditions that should apply. The legislation makes clear 
that the PBAC is the “gatekeeper” to the formulary; 
though the Minister is the final decision-maker, he 
may not add a drug to the formulary unless he has first 
received a positive recommendation from the PBAC.4
For many years, the addition of new drugs to the 
PBS formulary was based primarily on a consider-
ation of clinical need. In the late 1980s, however, the 
Australian Government took the unprecedented step 
of introducing an explicit consideration of “value for 
money” as a prerequisite for formulary listing. The 
economic evaluation requirement is not, as is often 
claimed, intended primarily as a mechanism of cost 
containment, but rather as a means of ensuring that 
the addition of each new drug to the formulary rep-
resents reasonable value for money for Australian 
taxpayers.5 
Although Australia was the first country to intro-
duce economic evaluation to support decision-making 
for its national formulary, pharmacoeconomic evalua-
tion to inform drug reimbursement and coverage deci-
sions is used in Canada (originally at provincial level 
in British Columbia and Ontario and later centrally 
through the Common Drug Review), in the U.K. by the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE), and the Scottish Medicines Consortium, and 
to varying degrees in a number of European countries 
including France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.6 This 
form of evaluation is sometimes referred to as a “fourth 
hurdle,” reflecting the additional obstacle to be over-
come by a drug company (over and above the require-
ment to demonstrate safety, efficacy, and quality for 
marketing approval) before funding of a new product 
within a public program. Although it is applied to only 
a very limited extent within U.S. federal programs, it 
is reportedly used by a number of large private insur-
ers and managed care organizations.7 Recently, there 
has also been growing interest in the establishment of 
a mechanism for the centralized evaluation of com-
parative effectiveness in the U.S., as a way to support a 
more value-based health care system.8 
Pharmaceutical companies seeking to add a drug to 
the PBS formulary must present a detailed submission 
according to a comprehensive set of guidelines, which 
describe how to identify, collate, and present the neces-
sary clinical and economic evidence.9 Under the legis-
lation, the PBAC may only recommend the listing of a 
One of the effects of the reference pricing system is that the prices of drugs 
may be linked irrespective of patent status. Although the pharmaceutical 
industry perceives this is as undermining the value of the patent, from the 
payer’s perspective, however, it may be argued that it is neither rational nor 
efficient to pay more for a drug just because it is patented if it confers no 
additional health benefit, than a drug whose patent has expired and is cheaper. 
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medicine after an explicit consideration of evidence of 
its comparative clinical effectiveness and cost relative 
to alternatives (which may be drug or non-drug thera-
pies).10 Where a drug is substantially more costly than 
available alternatives, it may only be listed if it offers, for 
some patients at least, a clinical advantage.11 Put simply, 
this means that unless a new drug offers an additional 
clinical benefit over an appropriate comparator, it may 
be added to the formulary, but cannot receive a higher 
price for subsidy purposes. A drug listed on this basis 
is subject to reference pricing – that is, it is linked by a 
“therapeutic relativity” to its comparator, either joining 
an existing reference pricing group or forming a new 
one. The price the government pays for any drug in a 
reference group is then set by the lowest price (known 
as the benchmark), which has been secured for any 
drug in the group. One of the effects of the reference 
pricing system is that the prices of drugs may be linked 
irrespective of patent status. Although the pharmaceu-
tical industry perceives this is as undermining the value 
of the patent, from the payer’s perspective, however, it 
may be argued that it is neither rational nor efficient 
to pay more for a drug just because it is patented if it 
confers no additional health benefit, than a drug whose 
patent has expired and is cheaper. 
Where a sponsor presents evidence that a new 
drug offers a clinical advantage over its comparator, 
the additional benefits are weighed against the addi-
tional costs in a cost-effectiveness or (preferably) a 
cost-utility analysis, and a determination is made as 
to whether the drug is acceptably cost effective at the 
price proposed by the drug’s sponsor. In this respect, 
the PBS operates as a therapeutic-value based pricing 
system: it may be thought of as “purchasing outcomes” 
rather than drugs. 
If a drug is not considered acceptably cost effective, 
then the sponsor may make a resubmission in which 
it could (1) present further evidence of incremental 
benefit over the comparator; (2) offer a reduction in 
the proposed price; or (3) try to identify an indication 
or patient population in which the drug is more cost 
effective. As a result, a drug may be listed on the PBS 
but with its subsidized use limited to certain indica-
tions, patient groups, or clinical settings in which 
it is determined to be both clinically and cost effec-
tive.12 Cost effectiveness is context dependent, and a 
drug may be acceptably cost effective when used for 
one indication or patient group, but not cost effective 
when used in other circumstances. 
While the deliberations of the PBAC are held in 
camera, detailed information on the committee’s rec-
ommendations and reasoning are made public after 
each meeting. Importantly, decision-making is at 
population level, and the PBS processes provide no 
mechanism for considering individual circumstances 
or accommodating individual needs and preferences, 
or for allowing an individual to challenge a coverage 
decision that he believes may affect him adversely. If 
a patient does not meet the listed criteria for subsidy, 
then there is no mechanism to consider an exception. 
The only mechanism for reconsidering a coverage 
decision is at the level of the decision to add a drug to 
the formulary.
As the PBS accounts for around 80 percent of pre-
scriptions dispensed in Australia, and more than 90 
percent of those dispensed in the community,13 the 
government wields significant monopsony power, and 
medicines which are not listed on the PBS generally 
have a limited market. To the pharmaceutical industry, 
the PBS processes are seen as a mechanism for price 
suppression.14 This has been reinforced by studies that 
have highlighted, at times inappropriately, differences 
in pharmaceutical prices between Australia and other 
OECD countries, particularly the U.S.,15 but without 
taking sufficient account of the benefits of an assured 
market with a high penetration of patented products.16 
Price comparisons are not straightforward and depend 
on a range of factors including treatment patterns and 
the basket of drugs compared. Comparisons with the 
U.S. are the most compelling but also the most likely 
to mislead. Prices paid for PBS–listed medicines are 
publicly available, but those paid by major third-party 
payers in the U.S. are not. In fact, some evidence sug-
gests that for drugs that represent significant advances 
in therapy – true therapeutic innovations – the prices 
paid in Australia are as high as in the U.S., and some-
times even higher, for biologics, in particular.17
Australians have an expectation that prescription 
medicines will be both accessible and affordable. In 
terms of its reach and impact, the PBS has been suc-
cessful in ensuring that all residents have access to a 
comprehensive range of prescription medicines drugs 
at prices that are affordable not only to individuals, but 
also to the government and the community as a whole.
The U.S. Approach to Prescription Drug 
Coverage: The Case of Medicare
In contrast to Australia, the U.S. has no national 
mechanism for ensuring prescription drug coverage 
for the population. As with other essential health care 
services (other than, perhaps, hospital care to screen 
and stabilize emergency medical conditions), the U.S. 
approach to health care is market based, meaning that, 
by and large, health care is dealt with as a commod-
ity. Of course, affordability is a recognized barrier, but 
no national financing mechanism exists to make health 
care affordable to the population. Instead, health insur-
ance for the under-65 population is a voluntarily con-
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ferred dimension of employee compensation.18 The fed-
eral and state governments jointly operate Medicaid, an 
essential public financing scheme for certain indigent 
populations such as low-income children, pregnant 
women, impoverished elderly, and disabled persons.19 
Only in the case of elderly persons and certain per-
sons with disabilities does the U.S., through Medicare, 
offer universal coverage and financing. Not until 2003, 
nearly 40 years after prescription drug coverage was 
first recommended, and 15 years after an initial Medi-
care prescription drug law was enacted and quickly 
repealed,20 did Congress add outpatient prescription 
drug benefits through enactment of the Medicare Pre-
scription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
(known as Medicare Modernization [MMA]).21
The MMA added a new section, Part D, to Medi-
care, which had previously consisted of three parts: A 
(hospital insurance), B (supplemental medical insur-
ance), and C (offering various forms of private health 
insurance coverage as a Medicare coverage option and 
renamed Medicare Advantage as part of the MMA). 
Although Part D is a complex law, it can basically be 
summarized as follows: the legislation entitles individ-
uals who qualify for Medicare Parts A and B coverage 
to voluntary, subsidized enrollment in a participating, 
commercially sponsored prescription drug plan. Pre-
scription drug plans are sold in decentralized, feder-
ally defined regional markets, and the public enroll-
ment subsidy is adjusted by family income, with low 
income Medicare beneficiaries fully subsidized for 
covered benefits. 
Under the standard benefit, Part D enrollees are 
entitled to covered plan benefits following satisfaction 
of an initial plan deductible. Initially, covered benefits 
are payable at a 75 percent rate up to an expenditure 
threshold; at this point, enrollees fall into what is 
known as a “doughnut hole” and must incur thousands 
of dollars in direct financial obligation for uncovered 
costs until they reach a second, catastrophic threshold. 
At this point, plan coverage resumes, with payment for 
95 percent of the recognized costs of covered benefits. 
The value of both the subsidy and the doughnut hole 
are pegged to an annual inflation rate, which means 
that the costs beneficiaries must incur continue to 
rise with time, along with the program’s financial pro-
tections. Low-income Medicare beneficiaries receive 
additional help through a special “low income sub-
sidy” program, but this assistance phases out at 150 
percent of the U.S. federal poverty level and contains 
strict asset and complex enrollment requirements. 
Prior to 2003, no Medicare prescription drug mar-
ket existed. Thus, in order to create a market for out-
patient prescription drug coverage, the law incentiv-
izes companies in several ways: indirectly, by creating a 
pool of “customers” who can afford their products, and 
directly through generous payments, “stop loss” protec-
tions against the risks of entering the market, and wide 
latitude within broad statutory rules to design their 
products. Thus, the U.S. has chosen to use its resources 
to stimulate a market both directly and indirectly.
The tortured structure of the legislation – and the 
high level of financial exposure enrollees continue to 
face – are the result of its design. Because the law relies 
exclusively on a heavily subsidized commercial market 
willed into being by the legislation, the nation must 
pay for private services including enrollment, coverage 
design, price negotiation and payment, program oper-
ations, and bill payment. Furthermore, because these 
tasks are the purview of market suppliers, data on their 
operations are considered proprietary and thus enjoy 
considerable public shield. Under these circumstances 
(as well as the right to exit the market whenever condi-
tions go south), it comes as little surprise that a robust 
prescription drug market quickly emerged.22
Part D plans come in two basic forms. Some offer 
coverage only for prescription drugs and are known as 
prescription drug plans (PDPs). Others are Medicare 
Advantage plans that offer coverage for all Medicare 
benefits (i.e., A, B, and D coverage) for a comprehensive 
fixed monthly premium and are known as Medicare 
Advantage – Prescription Drug Plans (MA-PD plans). 
 The existence of multiple providers was intended 
to support a key objective of Part D: to deliver a high 
degree of choice for beneficiaries. In some respects, 
it may be argued that in providing choice, Part D has 
been unexpectedly successful: the number of “stand-
alone” prescription drug plans (PDPs) and Medicare 
Advantage plans with prescription drug coverage 
(MA-PDs) exceeds predictions.23 The federal invest-
ment is estimated at $395 billion over ten years.24
Because Medicare Part D involves federal govern-
mental financing for voluntary private health insur-
ance, the cost of the coverage is high in relation to the 
benefits conferred. One prominent U.S. economist 
has estimated, for example, that citizens of France, the 
U.K., and Canada pay 34 to 59 percent of what it costs 
Americans for the same prescription drug market 
basket.25 Had Part D legislation mirrored Medicare’s 
initial design structure – that is, had the law relied 
on direct government financing for covered services 
at publicly negotiated rates – the coverage lapse con-
fronting beneficiaries with high health needs (i.e., 
the doughnut hole) might have been substantially 
eliminated. However, because eliminating the dough-
nut hole would have lowered the price of prescrip-
tion drugs by an estimated 45 percent (along with 
creating direct government control),26 the approach 
was politically unthinkable. (As it was, nearly super-
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human political effort was required to pass any gov-
ernment-financed prescription drug coverage scheme 
under Medicare, reflecting overwhelming industry 
resistance to any role for government 
in prescription drug financing and the 
memory on the part of many lawmak-
ers of the Medicare prescription drug 
debacle of 1988.)27 Indeed, so closely 
did the 2003 battle resemble the poli-
tics surrounding the passage of the 
original 1965 Medicare statute, that, 
as with the 1965 law, the 2003 legis-
lation famously contains a statutory 
non-interference clause prohibiting 
the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services from engaging in direct price 
negotiation.28 (The 1965 non-interfer-
ence clause prohibited interference in 
the practice of medicine; overt statutory prohibition 
against interfering in price negotiations was unnec-
essary since the original legislation was structured to 
effectively pay physicians what they charged.)29
Medicare PDPs and MA-PD plans compete over a 
range of plan characteristics; in theory at least, plans 
use this competition to drive drug price discounts. 
Enrollees may choose among plans offering different 
premiums, formularies, number of cost-sharing tiers, 
degrees of cost sharing, utilization management tools 
and extent, if any, of gap coverage. In 2007, the num-
ber of PDP choices ranges from 45 in Alaska to 66 in 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia; even greater num-
bers of MA-PD plans are available in each region, with 
nearly 4,000 across the country.30 So complex is the 
choice that both the government and private organiza-
tions have created online tools that allow both enroll-
ment (in the case of the government) and comparison 
shopping by price and coverage characteristics.31
Participating plans have a degree of autonomy in 
constructing their coverage design, which is presumed 
to operate on the basis of a formulary (as would any 
modern drug coverage scheme). The law specifies that 
if a participating provider uses a formulary, it must 
appoint a Pharmacy and Therapeutics committee to 
develop and review the formulary according to Model 
Guidelines developed by the U.S. Pharmacopoeia 
(USP).32 Moreover, if the formulary conforms to the 
Model Guidelines, then the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that over-
sees the Medicare program, must approve it. The USP 
Model Guidelines require each formulary to include 
at least two drugs within each pharmacologic class 
(as defined by USP) of covered Part D drugs, except 
for the so-called protected classes, for which the plans 
must cover “all or substantially all” drugs.33 In addi-
tion, each pharmacologic class is made up of a number 
of formulary key drug types (FKDTs), and plans must 
cover at least one drug in each FKDT.
Although “free market competition” and “choice” 
are words commonly used in describing Part D, the 
rules established by CMS on participating drug plans 
impose not inconsiderable constraints, with the result 
that the benefit more closely reflects a regulated 
industry than an unfettered, market-driven program. 
For example, the degree of granularity of both the 
pharmacologic classes and the FKDTs has increased 
with each of the three iterations of the Model Guide-
lines to date. For those subclasses containing only a 
single drug, plans that wish to comply with the Model 
Guidelines have no choice but to add the drug to the 
formulary – irrespective of the clinical place of the 
drug, the therapeutic benefit it confers, or the cost of 
its acquisition – and thus have little or no leverage in 
the price negotiation. Regulatory constraints tend to 
support the multiple-tiered benefit design that most 
providers have opted for. Some plans have as many 
as eight tiers, but most have three or four, with co-
payments increasing with each subsequent tier, and 
higher tiers typically requiring enrollees to contribute 
a 25 or 33 percent co-insurance amount rather than a 
fixed co-payment. In addition, providers have consid-
erable autonomy in the application of utilization man-
agement tools: prior authorization, quantity limits, 
and step therapy requirements. 
In sum, the theoretical long-term financial advan-
tages to be gained by stimulating robust market devel-
opment and entry through very high payments at the 
outset have been blunted by the realities of this par-
ticular type of market, which focuses on vulnerable 
populations, and a pharmaceutical industry with sur-
passing political power. The extent of the federal cov-
erage design standards ultimately included in the law 
are in part a testament to an industry whose overarch-
ing goal was to ensure the strongest possible strategic 
In view of the highly risk-averse nature of the 
insurance industry, decision-makers concluded 
that only relatively robust federal regulation 
could avert the complete avoidance of certain 
beneficiaries and conditions through the use of 
exclusionary design principles. But as each layer 
of design regulation is added, the ability  
to negotiate deep discounts is weakened. 
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position in relation to a heavily subsidized Medicare 
market. At the same time, the regulatory standards 
underscore the inherent asymmetry of information in 
U.S. health care purchasing, especially when the prod-
uct to be purchased is as complex as prescription drug 
coverage, and the consumers are elderly and disabled. 
Even the most intrepid Medicare beneficiaries would 
have difficulty navigating the plan choice comparison 
gauntlet (either the paper or online version). Fur-
thermore, more than a quarter of all beneficiaries are 
estimated to have a degree of cognitive impairment.34 
Thus, the goal of a truly competitive purchasing envi-
ronment has had to give way to market realities and 
concerns. These concerns are, of course, not irrational. 
In view of the highly risk-averse nature of the insur-
ance industry, decision-makers concluded that only 
relatively robust federal regulation could avert the 
complete avoidance of certain beneficiaries and con-
ditions through the use of exclusionary design princi-
ples.35 But as each layer of design regulation is added, 
the ability to negotiate deep discounts is weakened. 
Of course, it would have been unimaginable for Con-
gress and the President to say to Americans, “We are 
paying a king’s ransom to get private companies to do 
what we could do for you for half the price and more 
coverage.” Therefore, in the tradition of any political 
undertaking whose goal is to make a major change 
attractive to politicians and the general population 
alike, lawmakers stressed not only the additional bene-
fits (and indeed, prescription drug coverage has grown 
significantly since the law was enacted, from a quarter 
of seniors aged 65 or older without any form of drug 
coverage in 2003 to over 90 percent of the 44 million 
Medicare beneficiaries covered in 2007),36 but also the 
fact that the benefits would be consistent with Ameri-
can values: the right to choose and the right to all med-
ically necessary care recommended by a physician. 
Choice is a value that ostensibly permeates Ameri-
can society and culture, although the extent to which 
this emphasis on choice is a reflection of efforts on the 
part of the market to insist that people want choice 
above all, cannot be known. Studies of choice suggest, 
in fact, that having too many choices creates both con-
fusion and inefficiency.37 Therefore, whether people 
would have traded a degree of choice for the simplic-
ity and stability of traditional Medicare – especially 
had they understood how the program would work 
and had been told that they could get a good deal of 
more coverage through an approach that mirrored 
traditional Medicare – cannot be known. Since gov-
ernment administered coverage and pricing could not 
possibly have been enacted given the politics of the 
White House and Congress in 2003, such a dialogue 
would have been moot. 
Americans’ belief in the right (at least among affluent 
and insured persons) to all medically necessary care is 
so pervasive that most policymakers appear to consider 
it a policy canon that the electorate simply will not 
tolerate a public, transparent discussion concerning 
the tradeoff between ensuring decent coverage for all 
persons, and allowing some individuals to have access 
to virtually everything that is available, even as oth-
ers have virtually nothing. (A version of this was tried 
in the U.S. in Oregon in 1993, when then-Governor 
John Kitzhaber held a series of statewide discussions 
about rationing. In that case, however, the only indi-
viduals who were asked to give up coverage to aid the 
uninsured were the state’s poorest Medicaid-enrolled 
women and children).38 This inability to have a public 
discussion about national health policy choices in mod-
ern society was a strong undercurrent in the collapse of 
the Clinton health reform plan, and generally reflects 
a broader failure on the part of American society to be 
able to grapple with the notion of a collective, public 
decision to curb individual freedoms in the name of a 
social good. So ingrained is this individualism aspect 
of the American psyche that the policymaking process, 
ever eager to succeed politically, simply concludes that 
individual freedom is an essential dimension of any 
broad policy solution, regardless of need or topic. 
The Medicare prescription drug legislation tips its 
hat to the American psyche not only through its provi-
sions guaranteeing a choice of plans, but also through 
the coverage appeals process. In American law, it is a 
generally accepted aspect of fair process that insured 
individuals should have a means of challenging a 
denial of payment for a covered benefit on medical 
necessity grounds.39 But what is not legally accepted 
is the notion that Americans should have the right to 
challenge the design of the coverage itself.40 Indeed, 
where privately sponsored or purchased coverage and 
Medicaid are concerned, challenges to coverage design 
are dismissed as being without legal remedy, in defer-
ence to the discretion of payers in determining what 
will be covered. 
Medicare is profoundly different. Since 1999, the 
law has allowed beneficiaries to challenge coverage 
determinations under the traditional program. Medi-
care coverage determinations, like Australia’s PBS 
listing recommendations, consist of a structured tech-
nical and deliberative assessment of the evidentiary 
appropriateness of altering Medicare coverage design 
by recognizing a new technology or procedure. Part 
D follows suit, permitting enrollees to challenge not 
only the denial of a covered benefit, but also the design 
of coverage itself. This right to challenge population-
wide design limits included in any particular Part D 
plan is accomplished through a special appeals proce-
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dure known as the “exceptions” process. The process 
covers not only tiering design, but also the presence, 
in either a general or a particular form, of a specific 
drug on the formulary.41 As one might imagine, sup-
port for an exceptions process is politically strong; but 
even if public-coverage determinations were open to 
individual challenges, how would it be possible not to 
allow coverage-design challenges when the decision-
maker is a private company?
In truth, however, the Part D exceptions process is 
structured so as to create a nearly conclusive presump-
tion against design modification. The regulations that 
establish the exception process grant nearly total dis-
cretion to plans by providing that a plan “must” grant 
an exception “whenever it determines that the drug 
is medically necessary consistent with the physician’s 
[submission of proof].”42 However, within Medicare’s 
broad medical necessity standard,43 the plan’s precise 
medical necessity protocol, and the evidence that it 
may consider, are left entirely to the plan – hence, the 
legal legerdemain (the plan “must” grant the exception 
whenever the plan concludes, totally without regula-
tory encumbrance, that the exception is necessary).
As if a nearly unfettered grant of discussion were not 
sufficient, the regulations also impose a heavy eviden-
tiary burden on requesting physicians and patients. 
Under the exceptions rules, plans are empowered to 
require physicians to provide supporting documen-
tation demonstrating: the ineffectiveness of the drug 
on the formulary tier; or the likelihood of ineffec-
tiveness “based on both sound clinical evidence and 
medical and scientific evidence and the known rele-
vant physical or mental characteristics of the enrollee 
and known characteristics of the drug regimen; or 
an actual or likely adverse reaction “based on sound 
clinical evidence and medical and scientific evidence;” 
or the drug’s ineffectiveness or potential for adverse 
impact based on “sound clinical evidence and medical 
and scientific evidence and the known relevant physi-
cal or mental characteristics of the enrollee.”44 In other 
words, clinical judgment alone does not suffice; in the 
absence of scientific evidence the rule is constructed 
so as to allow the plan to deny the request, even when 
there is no scientific evidence to be had.
This legal allocation of the burden of proof in rela-
tion to the design of a formulary runs contrary to the 
expectation that the burden should fall on the entity 
with preferred knowledge position (in this case, the 
plan itself, which presumably would know why a 
drug was either wholly excluded or limited to restric-
tive terms of coverage). Furthermore, many physi-
cians would find meeting this burden of proof chal-
lenging in all but a few clinical circumstances. Other 
than excluding the use of a particular drug because of 
documented prior subjective treatment failure, previ-
ous or predictable adverse reactions on the part of the 
patient, or known drug-drug interaction, physicians 
would find that the necessary evidence regarding the 
effects of alternative drugs may be scarce, particularly 
so in the case of newer drugs. And if it is difficult for 
physicians to meet the evidentiary standard, then 
clearly it is impossible for enrollees. 
Federal public reporting requirements are so lim-
ited that the number of requested and granted excep-
tions is not known. One legal commentator who has 
written extensively on Medicare appeals procedures 
has reported that enrollees and those acting on their 
behalf have encountered significant problems both in 
requesting exceptions and in pursuing other coverage 
determinations and prosecuting appeals.45
In sum, while the architects of Part D have high-
lighted the unalloyed benefits of freedom of choice for 
Part D enrollees and have developed a paper system for 
challenging design limits, the reality is quite different. 
Many important characteristics of the program are 
involuntary, inequitable, and highly opaque. Enrollees 
are required to choose their plan on the basis of pre-
miums, drug price, and prescription regimens at the 
time that the law’s annual enrolment window is open. 
Not only does this have the effect of institutionalizing 
risk selection, but an objectively sensible and rational 
choice of plan can prove to be a costly mistake as prices 
rise throughout the year, new drugs are prescribed, or 
formularies are varied. Other than complying with the 
CMS regulations, plans are not required to disclose 
why certain drugs are, or are not, covered, nor in the 
majority of cases are the processes of formulary deci-
sion-making or benefit design transparent. 
This gap between the illusion of fairness and the 
reality for Medicare beneficiaries carries over into the 
appeals process. Enrollees are given the legal right to 
challenge plan design, a right that possibly might coun-
terbalance some of the (potential) problems that can 
arise if the patient has a rare condition or encounters 
a changing health need during an enrollment period. 
Yet, as we have shown, the burden of proof is extremely 
high in an exceptions challenge, and the plan has vir-
tually complete discretion to control the terms of the 
challenge, the methods used to evaluate the evidence, 
and the detailed standard of necessity itself. Even if the 
enrollee somehow enters the exceptions process, the 
time period for resolving the appeal can take years.46 
 Thus, in one sense at least, a tradeoff exists between 
transparency and opacity, certainty and flexibility. 
Part D enrollees may find that CMS rules are incon-
sistently applied and that formularies change over 
time, and that the reasons why particular drugs are, 
or are not covered, are obscure. They have the right to 
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appeal, given sufficient effort and determination to do 
so, but with an outcome that is by no means certain. 
The complexity and multiple levels of appeal in Part D 
thus serve to encourage the belief that no decision is 
final – that there is always a further avenue of appeal 
– but the tradeoff is a lot of secrecy that precedes it. 
The U.S. Trade Agenda and the Australia 
U.S. Free Trade Agreement
To the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and its peak 
body, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactur-
ers of America (PhRMA), “fourth hurdle” systems like 
the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme rep-
resent non-tariff barriers to overseas markets.47 This 
view is complemented by rhetoric intended to deflect 
criticism over the high prices of medicines in the U.S. 
– namely, that countries like Australia that impose 
“price controls” are “free-riding” on the R&D invest-
ment of U.S.-based companies, gaining access to inno-
vative medicines without contributing substantively 
to the costs of their discovery and development.48
In November 2001, WTO Members adopted the 
Doha Declaration on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement and Pub-
lic Health, which said that the TRIPs Agreement 
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.”49 But within a few months, the U.S. 
government had embarked on a bilateral and regional 
trade negotiation agenda incorporating TRIPs-plus 
intellectual property standards that would appear to 
be at odds with the intent of the declaration. The pur-
suit of higher standards of IP protection for pharma-
ceuticals, to prolong monopoly prices and delay the 
market entry of generic medicines, suggests a willing-
ness to further the interests of an industry sector even 
where the consequences might undermine the public 
health objectives of trading partners and their efforts 
to facilitate access to essential medicines.50
But this is not the only dimension of U.S. efforts 
to export its particular value system through the 
trade agenda. In 2002, Congress’ Trade Promotion 
Authority mandate directed the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) to seek “the elimination of 
government measures such as price controls and 
reference pricing which deny full market access for 
United States products” in markets abroad.51 The 
Australia U.S. Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), 
which entered into force in January 2005, was the 
United States’ first attempt to test whether a trade 
agreement could be used to bind another govern-
ment with respect to policies for subsidizing pre-
scription medicines for its citizens. A further attempt 
was made in the recent Korea U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment (KORUS) negotiation. 
Both the Australian (AUSFTA) and Korean 
(KORUS) Agreements contain provisions by which the 
U.S. has tried – arguably without success in Australia’s 
case – to limit the autonomy of its trading partners in 
evaluating, selecting, valuing, and reimbursing medi-
cines on their national formularies, to allow the mar-
ket a greater role in determining the demand for, and 
prices of reimbursed medicines. In Korea’s case, this 
followed a controversial 1999 medicine pricing agree-
ment in which the country agreed to set the prices of 
new medicines at the average G7 price – all countries 
with much higher per capita GDP.52 
While it is clearly too soon to determine the effect of 
the KORUS provisions on the Korean system, the issue 
of whether, and to what extent, the U.S. succeeded in 
its objectives is still being debated in Australia, more 
than two years after entry into force of the AUSFTA. 
The release of the AUSFTA text was met with claims 
that the obligations of the Pharmaceuticals Annex of 
the Agreement would undermine the fundamental 
listing and pricing processes of the PBS, and drive 
increases in the prices paid for PBS medicines. How-
ever, the specific (and it should be noted, reciprocal) 
obligations of the text, in fact refer only to timeliness, 
transparency, and consultation in formulary listing 
processes, and make no reference to pricing.53 
Two issues continue to draw scrutiny. Agreement to 
the establishment of an independent review mecha-
nism for the PBS listing process, to be made available 
to sponsors of unsuccessful PBS listing applications, 
led to claims that this would threaten PBAC’s gate-
keeper role and lead to the listing of less cost-effective 
medicines at higher prices than would have previously 
been the case.54 However, the independent review is 
not an appeal mechanism with the capacity to remake 
the Committee’s decision to recommend or reject a 
listing application; the outcome of any review, which 
is limited to a re-evaluation of issues in dispute and 
not of the recommendation itself, is a report back to 
the PBAC. The PBAC is then required to consider the 
reviewer’s findings, and determine whether they war-
rant a reconsideration of its conclusions in respect to 
the issues in dispute, and if so, whether any change 
in its views concerning those issues would cause it to 
reconsider its original recommendation.55 The review 
therefore functions as quality assurance process, 
rather than a mechanism of appeal.
The other key area of concern stems from certain 
“Agreed Principles” contained in the opening para-
graph of the Pharmaceuticals Annex. These state that 
the Parties are committed inter alia to “the need to pro-
mote timely and affordable access to innovative phar-
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maceuticals… (and) the need to recognize the value of 
innovative pharmaceuticals through the operation of 
competitive markets or by adopting or maintaining 
procedures that appropriately value the objectively 
demonstrated therapeutic significance of a pharma-
ceutical.”56 Despite the fact that the Agreed Principles 
are not couched in treaty-level language and confer no 
specific obligations on the parties, various commenta-
tors have argued that these, together with an obliga-
tion to participate in an AUSFTA Medicines Working 
Group with the U.S. – an annual bilateral discussion 
forum of health and trade officials – would be a mech-
anism by which the U.S. would continue to pressure 
Australia on its PBS listing and pricing policies and 
drive increases in the prices of PBS medicines.57 In 
fact, the prices of PBS medicines have not risen since 
the inception of the AUSFTA and under adminis-
trative arrangements introduced in August 2005 to 
reduce generics prices, the prices of many still-pat-
ented PBS medicines have been reduced through the 
flow-on effects of reference pricing.58
Nevertheless, renewed concern has been expressed 
since the recent announcement of modifications to the 
PBS known as “PBS Reform.”59 On August 1, 2007, the 
PBS was separated into two formularies – in simple 
terms, separating single and multi-source medicines 
– and various levers applied to reduce the prices of 
multi-source medicines. Reference-pricing mecha-
nisms will continue to apply to some extent within 
each formulary but not between them, and the flow-on 
of any price reductions – which would previously have 
been applied to any drug considered “equivalent at 
the population level” – will be largely limited to drugs 
considered either bioequivalent or “interchangeable 
at the patient level.”60 Predictably perhaps, it has been 
claimed that the changes are evidence that the Aus-
tralian Government has bowed to pressure from the 
U.S. in the AUSFTA Medicines Working Group to dis-
mantle reference pricing.61 This would imply that the 
U.S. could succeed – in a forum without any report-
ing or decision-making role – in convincing the Aus-
tralian Government to agree to changes to PBS listing 
and pricing policies that it had failed to gain agree-
ment to within the treaty negotiations. In reality, the 
changes are clearly a domestic response to longstand-
ing concern over the need to find ways to reduce gener-
ics prices (as evidenced by the administrative changes 
introduced in 2005), and to take advantage of a large 
number of major patent expiries to generate savings to 
the PBS that may be used to offset some of the costs 
of new listings.62 Importantly, while the changes limit 
the scope of reference pricing once drugs are subject to 
generic competition, they do not alter the application 
of therapeutic value-based pricing at the point at which 
a drug is added to the PBS. A new, patented medicine 
may still be listed at the price of an appropriate off-pat-
ent comparator at the time of listing, if it fails to dem-
onstrate superior efficacy or safety over the older drug. 
Conclusion
The U.S. has permitted those political interests steeped 
in a market ethos not only to control the domestic 
approach to health care financing (with results now 
approaching 17 percent of GDP) but also to dominate 
the nation’s position with trading partners. The result 
has been attempts to undermine other nations’ efforts 
to manage the impact of market failure and pursue 
population equity. Ironically, this driving emphasis 
on “open” markets comes at a time when the admin-
istration is promoting the concept of value-driven 
health care at home, through a heightened interest in 
comparative effectiveness.63 Yet in its bilateral trade 
agenda, the U.S. is trying not merely to undermine 
the pursuit of value-driven health care by its trading 
partners; in essence, it is attempting to remake other 
nations’ health systems in its own image. 
These actions also suggest that in a global economy, 
the political interests that resist government pricing 
structures in the U.S. view as equally essential the 
elimination of such constraints abroad. Together with 
the “free rider” myth – the notion that U.S. prices are 
high because other nations benefit from the innova-
tions of an industry without contributing to the costs 
of its R&D – these interests stress choice and freedom 
from design limits as fundamental values that must be 
advanced both here and throughout the world, even 
when the price of advancement may be financial jeop-
ardy to the social fairness that other nations value. 
Of course, what Americans would think if they 
knew how political and economic interests of a pow-
erful industry articulated their “values” cannot really 
be known, especially since framing the question itself 
introduces the questioner’s underlying values.64 One 
way to pose the question might be: should the people 
of all nations be able to benefit from the innovation of 
the American pharmaceutical industry, and should the 
very cost of innovation itself be protected as a matter 
of international policy that aims to eliminate “free rid-
ers”? However, another approach might be: how much 
value is gained by Americans and the world when U.S. 
lawmakers pursue the costliest policies under a guise of 
rights and fairness for U.S. citizens while characterizing 
other nations as “free riders” that attempt to maximize 
health outcomes and ensure fairness and equity for 
their own? In a world in which transparency of infor-
mation about public policy has become the exception 
rather than the norm, we doubt that the American pub-
lic will ever be given the opportunity to hear all sides. 
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